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STATE OF IDAHO
OFFICE OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

November 4,2008
HAND DELIVERY
Mr. Stephen Kenyon
Clerk of the Courts
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0101
Re:

State of ldaho v. Swindle (Docket No. 34658)
Letter of Supplemental Authority

Dear Mr. Kenyan:
Pursuant to I.A.R. 34(9, the state respectfully submits the following additional
cases as authority:
Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 855 n.4 (2006) (suppression issue)
Maryland v. ~rinqle,540 U.S. 366, 372-73 (2003) (suppression issue)
Copies of the foregoing cases are enclosed for the Court's
convenience.
Sincerely,

V .

Jess~caM. Lorello
Deputy Attorney General
Enclosures
cc:

Heather M. Carlson
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender

Criminal Law Division
RO. Box 83720, Boise, Idaho 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-2400, FAX: (208) 854-8074
Located at 700 W. State Street
Joe R. Williams Building, 4th Floor
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Supreme Court of the United States
Donald Curtis SAMSON, Petitioner,
v.
CALIFORNIA.
No. 04-9728.

assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which it
intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on the
other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate govemnentai interests.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.

pJ
Argued Feb. 22,2006.
Decided June 19,2006
Defendant was convicted in the
Background:
California Appellate Division of the Superior Court
of possession of methamphetamine. Defendant
appealed. The California Court of Appeal, &r,
J.,
2004 WL 23071 1 1 , affirmed. Defendant appealed.
Certiorari was granted.
Holding: The United States Supreme Court, Justice

Pardon and Parole 284 -64.1

284 Pardon and Pamle
284I1 Parole
284k44 Parole Conditions; Validity
284k64.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Parole is an established variation on imprisonment of
convicted criminals; the essence of parole is release
from prison, before the completion of sentence, on
the condition that the prisoner abides by certain rules
during the balance of the sentence.

m,held that suspicionless search of California

Pardon and Parole 284 -68

Affirmed

28411 Parole

narolee did not violate the Fourth Amendment.

Pardon and Parole

Justice Stevens filed an opinion dissenting in which
Justices $,&Q&
and
joined..
West Readnotes
Searches and Seizures 349 -23

284k68 k. Supervision of Parolee; Search.
Most Cited Cases
Suspicionless search of California parolee, conducted
pursuant to California law requiring all parolees to
agree to be subjected to search or seizure at any time,
did not violate the Fourth Amendment. U.S.C.A.
Const.Amend. 4.; West's Ann.Cal.Penal Code 6
3067(a).

-

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
-

m

k. Fourth Amendment and
Reasonableness in General. Most Cited Cases
The United States Supreme Court examines the
totality of the circumstances to determine whether a
search is reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. U.S.C.A. Coust.Amend. 4.
Searches and Seizures 349 -23

349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
-

k. Fourth Amendment and
Reasonableness in General. Most Cited Cases
M e t h e r a search is reasonable is determined by

FN* The syllahus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared

bv the Renorter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader. See United Stales
1,. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U.S.

321,337.26 S.Ct. 282.50 L.Ed. 499.
Pursuant to a California statute-which requires every
prisoner eligible for release on state parole to "agree
in writing to be subject to search or seizure by a
parole officer or other peace officer ..., with or
without a search warrant and with or without cause"and based solely on petitioner's parolee status, an
officer
searched
petitioner
and
found
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methamphetamine. The trial court denied his motions
to suppress that evidence, and he was convicted of
possession. Affirming, the State Court of Appeal held
ihat suspicionless searches of parolees are lawful
under California law and that the search in this case
was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment
because it was not arbitrary, capricious, or harassing.
Held. The Fourth Amendment does not prohibit a
police officer from conducting a suspicionless search
of a parolee. Pp. 2197 - 2202.

(a) The "totality of the circumstances" must be
examined to determine whether a search is reasonable
under the Fourth Amendment. United Sfatcs v.
Kni~hts. 534 U.S. 112, 118. 122 S.Ct. 587, 151
L.Ed.2d 497. Reasonableness "is determined by
assessing, on the one hand, the degree to which [the
search] intrudes upon an individual's privacy and, on
the other, the degree to which it is needed for the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests."
I d , at 118-119. 122 S.Ct. 587. Applying this
approach in &&&& the Court found reasonable the
warrantless search of a probationer's apartment based
on reasonable suspicion and a probation condition
authorized by California law. In evaluating the
degree of intrusion into Knights' privacy, the Court
found his probationary status "salient," id.. at 118,
122 S.Ct. 587, observing that probation is on a
continuum of possible punishments and that
probationers "do not enjoy 'the absolute liberty' " of
other citizens, id., at 119. 122 S.Ct. 587. It also
found probation searches necessary to promote
legitimate governmental interests of integrating
probationers back into the community, combating
recidivism, and protecting potential victims.
Balancing those interests, the intrusion was
reasonable. However, because the search was
predicated on both the probation search condition and
reasonable suspicion, the Court did not address the
reasonableness of a search solely predicated upon the
probation condition. Pp. 2197 - 2198.
(b) Parolees, who are on the "continuum" of stateimposed punishments, have fewer expectations of
privacy than probationers, because parole is more
akin to imprisonment than probation is. "The essence
*844 of parole is release from prison, before the
completion of sentence, on the condition that the
prisoner abides by certain rules during the balance of
the sentence." Morrinev v. Brewr. 408 U.S. 471.

**2195
477, 92 S.Ct. 2593. 33 L.Ed.2d 484.
California's system is consistent with these
observations. An inmate electing to complete his
sentence out of physical custody remains in the
Department of Corrections' legal custody for the
remainder of his term and must comply with the
terms and conditions of his parole. The extent and
reach of those conditions demonstrate that parolees
have severely diminished privacy expectations by
virtue of their status alone. Additionally, as in
&gh&
the state law's parole .search condition was
clearly expressed to petitioner, who signed an order
submitting to the condition and thus was
unambiguously aware of it. Examining the totality of
the circumstances, petitioner did not have an
expectation of privacy that society would recognize
as legitimate. The State's interests, by contrast, are
substantial. A State has an "overwhelming interest"
in supervising parolees because they "are more likely
to commit future criminal offenses." Pennsvlvania
Bd o f Probation and Parole v, Scott. 524 U.S. 357.
365, 1 I8 S.Ct. 2014. 141 L.Ed.2d 344. Similarly, a
State's interests in reducing recidivism, thereby
promoting reintegration and positive citizenship
among probationers and parolees, warrant privacy
intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under
the Fourth Amendment. The Amendment does not
render States powerless to address these concerns
effectively. California's 60-to-70-percent recidivism
rate demonstrates that most parolees are ill prepared
to handle the pressures of reintegration and require
intense supervision. The State Legislature has
concluded that, given the State's number of parolees
and its high recidivism rate, an individualized
suspicion requirement would undermine the State's
ability to effectively supervise parolees and protect
the public from criminal acts by reoffenders.
Contrary to petitioner's argument, the fact that some
States and the Federal Government require a level of
individualized suspicion before searching a parolee is
of little relevance in determining whether California's
system is drawn to meet the State's needs and is
reasonable, taking into account a parolee's
substantially diminished expectation of privacy. Nor
is there merit to the argument that California's law
grants discretion without procedural safeguards. The
concern that the system gives officers unbridled
discretion to conduct searches, thereby inflicting
dignitary harms that arouse shong resentment in
parolees and undermine their ability to reintegrate
into society, is belied by the State's prohibition on
arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches. And
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petitioner's concern that the law frustrates
reintegration efforts by permitting intrusions into the
privacy interests of third persons is unavailing
because that concern would arise under a suspicionbased system as well. Pp. 2198 - 2202.
Affirmed.
THOMAS, I., delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which ROBERTS, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY,
GINSBURG, and &KQ,JJ., joined. STEVENS,
J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which SOUTER and
BREYER, JJ., joined.
Ronald E. Nivel; for respondent.
Jonathan L. Marcus, for United States as amicus
curiae, by special leave of Court, supporting
respondent.
Martin Kassman, San Francisco, CA, Robert A.
Counsel of Record, Theodore P. Metzler,
Nicholas Cartier, Covington & Burling, Washington,
DC, for Petitioner.For U.S Supreme Court briefs,
see:2005 WL 3785204 (Pet.Brief)2006 WL 353467
(Reply .Brief)

m,

**2196 Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of
the Court.
*846 Califomia law provides that every prisoner
eligible for release on state parole "shall agree in
writing to be subject to search or seizure by a parole
officer or other peace officer at any time of the day or
night, with or without a search warrant and with or
without cause." Cal.Penal Code Ann. 6 3067(a)
(West 2000). We granted certiorari to decide whether
a suspicionless search, conducted under the authority
of this statute, violates tlie Constitution. We hold that
it does not.

In September 2002, petitioner Donald Curtis Samson
was on state parole in California, following a
conviction for being a felon in possession of a
firearm. On September 6, 2002, Officer Alex
Rohleder of the San Bruno Police Department
observed petitioner walking down a street with a
woman and a child. Based on a prior contact with
petitioner, Officer Rohleder was aware that petitioner
was on parole and believed that he was facing an at
large warant. Accordingly, Officer Rohleder stopped
petitioner and asked him whether he had an

outstanding parole warrant. Petitioner responded that
there was no outstanding warrant and that he "was in
good standing with his parole agent." Brief for
Petitioner 4. Officer Rohleder confirmed, by radio
dispatch, that petitioner was on parole and that he did
not have an outstanding warrant. Nevertheless,
pursuant to Cal.Pena1 Code Ann. 6 3067(a) (West
2000) and based solely on petitionerGs*847status as a
parolee, Officer Rohleder searched petitioner. During
the search, Officer Rohleder found a cigarette box in
petitioner's left breast pocket. Inside the box he found
a plastic baggie containing methamphetamine.
The State charged petitioner with possession of
methamphetamine pursuant to Cal. Health & Safety
Code Ann. 5 11377(a) (West 1991). The trial court
denied petitioner's motion to suppress the
methamphetamine evidence, finding that Cal.Pena1
Code Ann. 6 3067(a) (West 2000) authorized the
search and that the search was not "arbitraty or
capricious." App. 62-63 (Proceedings on Motion to
Supress). A jury convicted petitioner of the
possession charge and the trial court sentenced him to
seven years' imprisonment.
The Califomia Court of Appeal affirmed. Relying on
People v Reves, 19 Cal.4th 743. 80 Cal.Rc&&i,BL
968 P.2d 445 119981, the court held that suspicionless
searches of parolees are lawful under California law;
that " '[sluch a search is reasonable within the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment as long as it is not
arbitrary, capricious or harassing' "; and that the
search in this case was not arbitrary, capricious, or
harassing. No. A102394 (Ct.App.Cal., 1st App. Dist.,
Oct. 14,2004), App 12-14.
We granted certiorari,
162 L.Ed2d 933 (20051, to answer a variation of the
question this Court lefi open in United States v.
Kni~hts534 U.S. 112. 120. n. 6. 122 S.Ct. 587. 151
LEdd2d 497 (2001)-whether a condition of release
can so diminish or eliminate a released prisoner's
reasonable expectation of privacy that a suspicionless
search by a law enforcement officer would not offend
~
that question
the Fourth ~ m e n d m e n t . Answering
in the affirmative today, we affirm the judgment of
the California Court of Appeal.

FNI.

Kniqhts, 534 U.S.. at 120. n. 6. 122
S.Ct. 587 ("We do not decide whether the
probation condition so diminished, or
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completely eliminated, Knights' reasonable
expectation of privacy ... that a search by a
law enforcement officer without any
individualized suspicion would have
satisfied the reasonableness requirement of
the Fourth Amendment").

JlJpJ

"[Ulnder our general Fourth Amendment
approach" we "examin [el the totality of the
circumstances" to determine whether a search is
reasonable within the meaning of the Fourth
Amendment. Id., at 118, 122 S.Ct. 587 (internal
quotation marks omitted). Whether a search is
reasonable "is determined by assessing, on the one
hand, the degree to which it intrudes upon an
individual's privacy and, on the other, the degree to
which it is needed for the promotion of legitimate
governmental interests." Id, at 118-1 19, 122 S.Ct.
587 (internal quotation marks omitted).
We recently applied this approach in Unlled Slates v.
K
&
J&
In that case, California law required
Knights, as a probationer, to" '[slubmit his ... person,
property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects,
to search anytime, with or without a search warrant,
warrant of arrest or reasonable cause by any
probation officer or law enforcement officer.' " &
I
at 114. 122 S.Ct. 587 (brackets in original). Several
days after Knights had been placed on probation,
police suspected that he had been involved in several
incidents of arson and vandalism. Based upon that
suspicion and pursuant to the search condition of his
probation, a police officer conducted a warrantless
search of Knights' apartment and found arson and
drug paraphernalia. & at 115-116, 122 S.Ct. 587.
We concluded that the search of Knights' apartment
was reasonable. In evaluating the.degree of intrusion
into Knights' privacy, we found Knights'
probationary status "salient," id.. at 118, 122 S.Ct.
observing that "[plrobation is 'one point ... on a
continuum of possible punishments ranging from
solitary confinement in a maximum-security facility
to a few hours of mandatory community service.' "
122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Griffin vY
Wisconrin, 483 U.S. 868, 874, 107 S.Ct. 3164. 97
L.Ed.2d 709 (1987)). Cf. Hudsoiz v. Palmer, 468 U.S.
517, 530. 104 S.Ct. 3194. 82 L.Ed.2d 393 (19841
(holding that prisoners have no reasonable

expectation of privacy). We krther observed that, by
virtue of their status alone, probationers " 'do not
enjoy "the absolute liberty to which every "849
citizen is entitled," ' " Knirhts, supra, at 119. 122
S.Ct. 587 (quoting Griffin, supra, at 874. 107 S.Ct.
-.
3164,in turn quoting Murrisscv v. Brewer, 408 U.S.
471, 480, 92 S.Ct. 2593. 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (19721),
justifying the "impos[ition] [of] reasonable
conditions that deprive the offender of some
freedoms enjoyed by law-abiding citizens."
Knighfs,supra, at 119, 122 S.Ct. 587. We also
considered the facts that Knights' probation order
clearly set out the probation search condition, and
that Knights was clearly informed of the condition.
See
We
concluded that under these circumstances, Knights'
expectation of privacy was significantly diminished.
See id., at 119-120. 122 S.Ct. 587.
We also concluded that probation searches, such as
the search of Knights' apartment, are necessary to the
promotion of legitimate governmental interests.
Noting the State's dual interest in integrating
probationers back into the community and combating
recidivism, see i d . at 120-121, 122 S.Ct. 587, we
credited the " 'assumptio~~'" that, by virtue of his
status, a probationer " 'is more likely than the
ordinary citizen to violate the law.' " I d . at 120,
122 S.Ct. 587 (quoting Griffin.suora, at 880. 107
S.Ct. 3164). We further found that "probationers
have even more of an incentive to conceal their
criminal activities and quickly dispose of
incriminating evidence than the ordinary criminal
because probationers are aware that they may be
subject to supervision and face revocation *"2198 of
probation, and possible incarceration, in proceedings
in which the trial rights of a jury and proof beyond a
reasonable doubt, among other things, do not apply.''
Kniphfs. 534 U.S.. at 120, 122 S.Ct. 587. We
explained that the State did not have to ignore the
reality of recidivism or suppress its interests in
"protecting potential victims of criminal enterprise"
for fear of running afoul of the Fourth Amendment.
Id. at 121, 122 S.Ct 587.
Balancing these interests, we held that "[wlhen an
officer has reasonable suspicion that a probationer
subject to a search condition is engaged in criminal
activity, there is enough likelihood that criminal
conduct is occurring that an intrusion on the
probationer's significantly diminished privacy*850
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interests is reasonable." Ibid.Because the search at
issue in &&&
was predicated on both the
probation search condition and reasonable suspicion,
we did not reach the question whether the search
would have been reasonable under the Fourth
Amendment had it been solely predicated upon the
condition of probation. Id.. at 120. n. 6. 122 S.Ct.
587.0ur attention is directed to that question today,
albeit in the context of a parolee search.

121 As

parolees are on. the
we noted in
"continuum" of state-imposed punishments.
119, 122 S.Ct. 587 (internal quotation marks
omitted). On this continuum, parolees have fewer
expectations of privacy than probationers, because
parole is more akin to imprisonment than probation is
to imprisonment. As this Court has pointed out,
"parole is an established variation on imprisonment
of convicted criminals .... The essence of parole is
release from prison, before the completion of
sentence, on the condition that the prisoner abides by
certain rules during the balance of !he sentence."
Morrissev, suoru, at 477. 92 S.Ct. 2593. "In most
cases, the State is willing to extend parole only
because it is able to condition it upon compliance
with certain requirements."
Pennsvlvaniu Bd of
Probation and Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357. 365,
118 S.Ct. 2014. 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998). See also
United States v. Reves. 283 F.3d 446. 461 (C.A.2
2002) ("[Fjederal supervised release, ... in contrast to
probation, is meted out in addition to, not in lieu of,
incarceration" (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); United States v. Cardona. 903 F.2d 60,
63 (C.A.1 1990) ("[Oln the Court's continuum of
possible punishments, parole is the stronger
medicine; ergo, parolees enjoy even less of the
average citizen's absolute liberty than do
probationers" (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted)).=
FN2. Contrary to the dissent's
-

contention,
nothing in our recognition that parolees are
more akin to prisoners than probationers is
inconsistent with our precedents. Nor, as the
dissent suggests, do we equate parolees with
prisoners for the purpose of concluding that
parolees, like prisoners, have no Fourth
Amendment rights. See post, at 2204
(opinion of STEVENS, J.). That view

misperceives our holding. If that were the
basis of our holding, then this case would
have been resolvedsolely under Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 104 S.Ct. 3194, 82
L.Ed.2d 393 (19841, and there would have
been no cause to resort to Fourth
Amendment analysis. See ihid.(holding
traditional Fourth Amendment analysis of
the totality of the circumstances inapplicable
to the question whether a prisoner had a
reasonable expectation of privacy in his
orison cell). Nor is our rationale inconsistent
with ~ o r i i s s e vv. Brewer. 408 U.S. 471,
482. 92 S.Ct. 2593, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (19721.
In that case, the Court recognized that
restrictions on a parolee's lib& are not
unqualified. That statement, even if accepted
as a truism, sheds no light on the extent to
which a parolee's constitutional rights are
indeed limited-and no one argues that a
parolee's constitutional rights are not
limited. Morrissey itself does not cast
doubt on today's holding give11 that the
liberty at issue in that case-the Fourteenth
Amendment Due Process right to a hearing
before revocation of parole-invokes wholly
different analysis than the search at issue
here.
""2199 *851 California's system of parole is
consistent with these observations: A California
inmate may serve his parole period either in physical
custody, or elect to complete his sentence out of
physical custody and subject to certain conditions.
Cal.Pena1 Code Ann. S 3060.5 (West 2000). Under
the latter option, an inmate-turned-parolee remaiils in
the legal custody of the California Department of
Corrections through the remainder of his term, 5
3056, and must comply with all of the terms and
conditions of parole, including mandatory drug tests,
restrictions on association with felons or gang
members, and mandatory meetings with parole
officers, Cal.Code Regs.. tit. 15. 6 2512 f2905];
Cal.Penal Code Ann. 6 3067 (West 2000). See also
Morrissev.su~ra. at 478, 92 S.Ct 2593 (discussing
other permissible terms and conditions of parole).
General conditions of parole also require a parolee to
report to his assigned parole officer immediately
upon release, inform the parole officer within 72
hours of any change in employment status, request
permission to travel a distance of more than 50 miles
from the parolee's home, and refrain from criminal
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conduct and possession of firearms, specified
weapons, or knives unrelated to employment.
"852CaI.Code Re~s.,tit. 15, 6 2512. Parolees may
also be subject to special conditions, including
psychiatric
treatment
programs,
mandatory
abstinence from alcohol, residence approval, and
"[alny other condition deemed necessary by the
Board [of Parole Hearings] or the Department [of
Corrections and Rehabilitation] due to unusual
circumstances."§ 2513. The extent and reach of
these conditions clearly demonstrate that parolees
like petitioner have severely diminished expectations
of privacy by virtue of their status alone.
Additionally, as we found "salient" in &&&
with respect to the probation search condition, the
parole search condition under California lawrequiring inmates who opt for parole to submit to
suspicionless searches by a parole officer or other
peace officer "at any time," Cal.Penal Code Ann. 5
3067(a) (West 2000)-was "clearly expressed" to
petitioner. Kni~hts.534 US.. at 119. 122 S.Ct. 587.
He signed an order submitting to the condition and
thus was "unambiguously" aware of it.
In
&&h&
we found that acceptance of a clear and
unambiguous search condition "significantly
diminished Knights' reasonable expectation of
privacy." Id, at 120, 122 S.Ct 587. Examining
the totality of the circumstances pertaining to
petitioner's status as a parolee, "an established
variation on imprisonment," Morrissev, 408 U.S.. at
477. 92 S.Ct. 2593, including the plain terms of the
parole search condition, we conclude that petitioner
did not have an expectation of privacy that society
would recognize as ~ e ~ i t i m a t e . ~

-

FN3. Because
-

we find that the search at
issue here is reasonable under our general
Fourth Amendment approach, we need not
reach the issue whether "acceptance of the
search condition constituted consent in the
sense of a comwlete waiver of his Fourth
Amendment rights." Unired Stales v.
Kniphts. 534 U.S. 112. 118, 122 S.Ct. 587,
151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). The California
Supreme Court has not vet construed
Cai.~enalCode Ann. 6 3067 (West 2000),
the statute which governs parole for crimes
committed after 1996, and which imposes

the consent requirement. The California
Court of Appeal has, and it has concluded
that, under m ( b ) , "inmates who are
otherwise eligible for parole yet refuse to
agree to the mandatory search condition will
remain imprisoned ... until either the inmate
(1) agrees to the search condition and is
otherwise eligible for parole or (2) has lost
all worktime credits and is eligible for
release after having served the balance of
hisiher sentence."
People v. Middleton.
131 Cal.Avv.4th 732. 739-740. 31
Cal.Rptr.3d 813, 818 120051. Nonetheless,
we decline to rest our holding today on the
consent rationale. The California Supreme
Court, we note, has not yet had a chance to
address the question squarely, and it is far
from clear that the State properly raised its
consent theory in the courts below.
Nor do we address whether California's
~ a r o l esearch condition is justified as a
special need under Griiiin v. Wisconsin.
483 U.S. 868, 107 S.Ct. 3164. 97 L.Ed.2d
709 (1987), because our holding under
general Fourth Amendment principles
renders such an examination unnecessiuy.
**2200 "853 The State's interests, by contrast, are
substantial. This Court has repeatedly acknowledged
that a State has an "overwhelming interest" in
supervising parolees because "parolees ... are more
likely to commit future criminal offenses."
Penizsvlvaaia Bd ofProbation and Parole, 524 US.,
at 365. 118 S.Ct 2014 (explaining that the interest in
combating recidivism "is the very premise behind the
system of close parole supervision"). Similarly, this
Court has repeatedly acknowledged that a State's
interests in reducing recidivism and thereby
promoting reintegration and positive citizenship
among probationers and parolees warrant privacy
intrusions that would not otherwise be tolerated under
the Fourth Amendment. See Griffin,483 US.. at 879,
107 S.Ct. 3164: Kiziehts, supra, at 121, 122 S.Ct.
587.
The empirical evidence presented in this case clearly
demonstrates the significance of these interests to the
State of California. As of November 30, 2005,
California had over 130,000 released parolees.
California's parolee population has a 68-to-70 percent

0 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works.

126 S.Ct. 2193
Page 7'
547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250,74 USLW 4349,06 CaI. Daily Op. Serv. 5257,2006 Daily Journal
D.A.R. 7626,2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7627,2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7630, I9 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 306

recidivism rate. See California Attorney General,
Crime in California 37 (Apr.2001) (explaining that
68 percent of adult parolees are returned to prison, 55
percent for a parole violation, 13 percent for the
commission of a new felony offense); J. Petersilia,
Challenges of Prisoner Reentry and Parole in
California, 12 California Policy Research Center
Brief, p. 2 (June 20001, available at http:/l *854
www.ucop.edulcprc1parole.pdf (as visited June IS,
2006, and available in Clerk of Court's case file)
("70% of the state's paroled felons reoffend within I8
months-the highest recidivism rate in the nation").
This Court has acknowledged the grave safety
concerns that attend recidivism. See Ewinn v.
Culifor~~ia,
538 U.S. 11. 26. 123 S.Q. 1179, 155
L.Ed.2d 108 (20031 (plurality opinion) ("Recidivism
is a serious public safety concern in California and
throughout the Nation").
As we made clear in &&&the
Fourth Amendment
does not render the States powerless to address these
concerns effectively. See 534 US.. at 121, 122 S.Ct.
587. Contrary to petitioner's contention, California's
ability to conduct suspicionless searches of parolees
serves its interest in reducing recidivism, in a manner
that aids, rather than hinders, the reintegration of
parolees into productive society.

-

In California, an eligible inmate serving a
determinate sentence may elect parole when the
actual days he has served plus statutory time credits
equal the term imposed by the trial court, Cal.Pena1
Code Ann. 66 2931, 2933, 3000(b)(l) (West 2000),
irrespective of whether the inmate is capable of
integrating himself back into productive society. As
the recidivism rate demonstrates, most parolees are ill
prepared to handle the pressures of reintegration.
Thus, most parolees require intense supervision. The
California Legislature has concluded that, given the
number of inmates the State paroles and its high
recidivism rate, a requirement that searches be based
on individualized suspicion**2201 would undermine
the State's ability to effectively supervise parolees
and protect the public from criminal acts by
reoffenders. This conclusion makes eminent sense.
Imposing a reasonable suspicion requirement, as
urged by petitioner, would give parolees greater
ovvortunitv to anticipate searches and conceal
ckkinali$. See ~ n i z i t s ,suDra, at 120, 122 S.Ct.
Griffin. 483 U.S.. at 879. 107 S.Ct. 3164.
This Court concluded that the incentive-to-conceal

concern justified an "intensive" system for
supervising probationers in -id.,
at 875, 107
S.Ct. 3164. That concern applies *855 with even
greater force to a system of supervising parolees. See
United Stutes v. Reves, 283 F.3d. at 461 (obsewing
that the @
&
J
Y
rationale "appl[ies] u fortior?' to "
Federal supervised release, which, in contrast to
probation, is 'meted out in addition to, not in lieu of,
incarceration' "); United States v. Crawford. 372
F.3d 1048. 1077 (C.A.9 20041 (en banc) (Kleinfeld,
J., conculring) (explaining that parolees, in contrast
to probationers, "have been sentenced to prison for
felonies and released before the end of their prison
terms" and are "deemed to have acted more
harmfully than anyone except those felons not
released on parole"); Hudson, 468 U.S., at 526, 104
S.Ct. 3194 (persons sentenced to terms of
imprisotunent have been "deemed to have acted more
harmfully than anyone except those felons not
released on pamle"); id.. at 529, 104 S.Ct. 3194
(observing that it would be " naive" to institute a
system of " 'planned random searches' " as that
would allow prisoners to "anticipate" searches, thus
defeating the purpose of random searches).
Petitioner observes that the majority of States and the
Federal Government have been able to further similar
interests in reducing recidivism and pronloting reintegration, despite having systems that permit
parolee searches based upon some level of suspicion.
Thus, petitioner contends, California's system is
constitutionally defective by comparison. Petitioner's
reliance on the practices of jurisdictions other than
California, however, is misplaced. That some States
and the Federal Government require a level of
individualized suspicion is of little relevance to o w
determination whether California's supervisory
system is drawn to meet its needs and is reasonable,
taking into account a parolee's substantially
diminished expectation of privacy
FN4. The
-

dissent argues that, "once one
acknowledges that parolees do have
legitimate expectations of privacy beyond
those of prisoners, our Fourth Amendment
jurisprudence does not permit the
conclusion, reached by the Court here for
the first time, that a search supported by
neither individualized suspicion nor 'special
needs' is nonetheless 'reasonable.' " Post,
at 2203. That simply is not the case. The

O 2008 Thomson ReutersIWest. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works

Page 8 '
126 S.Ct. 2193
547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed.2d 250,74 USLW 4349,06 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 5257,2006 Daily Journal
D.A.R. 7626,2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7627,2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7630, 19 Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 306

touchstone of the Fourth Amendment is
reasonableness,
not
iiidividualized
suspicion. Thus, while this Court's
jurisprudence has often recognized that "to
accommodate public and private interests
some quantum of individualized suspicion is
usually a prerequisite to a constitutional
search or seizure," United States v.
Martinez-Fuerte. 428 U.S. 543, 560, 96
S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116 (19761, we
have also recognized that the "Fourth
Amendment imposes no irreducible
requirement of such suspicion," &&.X&
96 S.Ct. 3074. Therefore, although this
Court has only sanctioned suspicionless
searches in limited circumstances, namely
programmatic and special needs searches,
we have never held that these are the only
limited circumstances in which searches
absent individualized suspicion could be
"reasonable" under the Fourth Amendment.
In light of California's earnest concerns
respecting recidivism, public safety, and
reintegration of parolees into productive
society, and because the object of the Fourth
Amendment is reasonableness, our decision
today is far from remarkable. Nor, given our
prior precedents and caveats, is it
"unprecedented." Post, at 2202.
**2202 *856 Nor is there merit to the argument that
California's parole search law permits "a blanket
grant of discretion untethered by any procedural
safeguards,"post, at 2202 (STEVENS, J., dissenting).
The concern that California's suspicionless search
system gives officers unbridled discretion to conduct
searches, thereby inflicting dignitary harms that
arouse strong resentment in parolees and undermine
their ability to reintegrate into productive society, is
belied bv California's prohibition on " arbitrary,
canricious or harassing" searches. See RevesJ
,,TbL

'

,-",

%.

--

-

, .

,-,.

ba,.L.vL8.-"

*""

P.2d. at 450, 451: P e o ~ l ev Bravo. 43 Cal.3d 600
610*, 7 2 Q P-I.,..
r l lRntr
?... 787 73%D1l'
I.&"
*242 (&
.ohation); see also Cal.Pena1 Code Ann. !
?west 2000) ("It is not the intent of the Legislature to
authorize law enforcement officers to conduct
searches for the sole purpose of h a r a ~ s m e n t " ) . ~
The dissent's claim that parolees under California law
are subject to capricious searches conducted at the
unchecked "whim" of law enforcement officers, pofl,
at 2203, 2204, ignores this prohibition. Likewise,
JJV.

-

petitioner's concern that California's suspicionless
search law frustrates reintegration efforts by
permitting intrvsions into *857 the privacy interests
of third parties is also unavailing because that
concern would arise under a suspicion-based regime
as well.

aUnder California precedent, we note,
an officer would not act reasonably in
conducting a suspiciouless search absent
knowledge that the person stopped for the
search is a parolee. See People v. Sanders,
31 Cal.4th 318. 331-332, 2 Cal.Rutr.3d 630,
73 P.3d 496. 505-506 (20031; Brief for
United States as Amicus Curiae 20.

Thus, we conclude that the Fourth Amendment does
not prohibit a police officer from conducting a
suspiciouless search of a parolee. Accordingly, we
affirm the judgment of the California Court of
Appeal.
/t is so ordered
Justice STEVENS, with whom Justice SOUTER and
Justice BREYER join, dissenting.
Our prior cases have consistently assumed that the
Fourth Amendment provides some degree of
protection for probationers and parolees. The
protection is not as robust as that afforded to ordinary
citizens; we have held that probationers' lowered
expectation of privacy may justify their warrantless
search upon reasonable suspicion of wrongdoing, see
United States v. Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct.
587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 120011. We have also
recognized that the supervisory responsibilities of
probation officers, who are required to provide "
'individualized counseling' " and to monitor their
charges' progress, Griffin v. Wisconsin. 483 U.S. 868,
876-877. 107 S.Ct. 3164.97 L.Ed.2d 709 (19871, and
who are in a unique position to judge "how close a
supervision the probationer requires," id.. at 876,
107 S.Ct. 3164, may give rise to special needs
justifying departures from Fourth Amendment
strictures. See ibid. ("Although a probation officer is
not an impartial magistrate, neither is he the police
officer who normally conducts searches against the
ordinary citizen"). But neither &&& nor &@&
supports a regime of suspicionless searches,
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conducted pursuant to a blanket grant of discretion
untethered by any procedural safeguards, by law
enforcement personnel who have no special interest
in the welfare of the parolee or probationer.
What the Court sanctions today is an unprecedented
curtailment of liberty. Combining faulty syllogism
with circular*858 reasoning, the Court concludes that
parolees**2203 have no more legitimate an
expectation of privacy in their persons than do
prisoners. However superficially appealing that parity
in treatment may seem, it runs roughshod over our
precedent. It also rests on an intuition that fares
poorly under scrutiny. And once one acknowledges
that parolees do have legitimate expectations of
privacy beyolid those of prisoners, our Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence does not permit the
conclusion, reached by the Court here for the first
time, that a search supported by neither
individualized suspicion nor "special needs" is
nonetheless "reasonable."
The suspicionless search is the very evil the Fourth
Amendment was intended to stamp out. See &y&
UniledSWes, 116 U.S. 616,625-630.6 S.Ct. 524.29
L.Ed. 746 (1886); see also, e.g., Indianauolis v.
Edmond, 531 U.S. 32.37, 121 S.Ct. 447. 148 L.Ed.2d
333 (2000). The pre-Revolutiona~y "writs of
assistance," which permitted roving searches for
contraband, were reviled precisely because they
"placed 'the liberty of every man in the hands of
every peny officer.' " Bovd 116 US.. at 625. 6
S.Ct. 524. While individualized suspicion "is not an
'irreducible' component of reasonableness" under the
Fourth Amendment, Edmond. 531 U.S., at 37. 121
S.Ct. 447 (quoting
L e -U
428 U.S. 543. 561. 96 S.Ct. 3074, 49 L.Ed.2d 1116
11976)),the requirement has been dispensed with
only when programmatic searches were required to
meet a " 'special need' ... divorced from the State's
general interest io law enforcement." Ferzuson v.
L.Ed.2d 205 (2001); see Ed~nond,531 US.. at 37,
121 S.Ct. 447; see also Griftin. 483 U.S., at 873,
107 S.Ct. 3164 ("Although we usually require that a
search be undertaken only pursuant to a warrant (and
thus supported by probable cause, as the Constitution
says warrants must he), ... we have permitted
exceptions when 'special needs, beyond the normal
need for law enforcement, make the warrant and
probable-cause requirement impracticable' ").

Not surprisingly, the majority does not seek to justify
the search of petitioner on "special needs" grounds.
Although the Court has in the past relied on special
needs to uphold *859 warrantless searches of
probationers, &at 873, 880, 107 S.Ct. 3164, it has
never gone so far as to hold that a probationer or
parolee may he subjected to hll search at the whim
of any law enforcement officer he happens to
encounter, whether or not the officer has reason to
suspect him of wrongdoing.
C
&
&
after all,
involved a search by a probation officer that was
supported by reasonable suspicion. The special role
of probation officers was critical to the analysis; "we
deal with a situation," the Court explained, "in which
there is an ongoing supervisory relationship-and one
that is not, or at least not entirely, adversarialbetween the object of the search and the
decisionmaker." Id., at 879. 107 S.Ct. 3164. The
State's interest or " special need," as articulated in
was an interest in supervising the wayward
probationer's reintegration into society-not, or at least
not principally, the general law enforcement goal of
detecting crime, see ante, at 2 2 0 0 . ~

FNI. As

we observed in Ferruson v.
Charleston, 532 U.S. 67, 121 S.Ct 1281,
149 L.Ed.2d 205 (2001),
special
needs rationale was cast into doubt by our
later decision in Skinner v. Railwav Labor
Executives' Assn., 489 U.S. 602. 109 S.Ct.
1402. 103 L.Ed.2d 639 (19891, which
reserved the question whether " 'routine use
in criminal prosecutions of evidence
obtained pursuant to the administrative
scheme would give rise to an inference of
pretext, or otherwise impugn the
administrative nature of the ... program,' "
Fer,euson, 532 US., at 79, n. 1.5, 121 S.Ct.
1281 (quoting Skinner. 489 U.S.. at 621. n.
5. 109 S.Ct. 14021, But at least the State in
@
&
J
could in good faith contend that its
warrantless searches were supported by a
special need conceptually distinct from law
enforcement goals generally. Indeed, that a
State's interest in supervising its parolees
and probationers to ensure their smooth
reintegration may occasionally diverge from
its general law enforcement aims is
illustrated by this very case. Petitioner's
possession of a small amount of illegal
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drugs would not have been grounds for
revocation of his parole. See Cal.Pena1 Code
Ann. 6 3063.1(a) (West Supp.2006).
Presumably, the California Legislature
determined that it is unnecessary and
perhaps even counterproductive, as a means
of furthering the goals of the parole system,
to reincarcerate former prisoners for simple
possession, The general law enforcement
interests the State espouses, by contrast, call
for reincarceration.
**2204 It is no accident, then, that when we later
upheld the search of a probationer by a law
enforcement oflcer (again, *860 based on reasonable
suspicion), we forwent any reliance on the special
needs doctrine. See Kniehfs, 534 U.S. 112. 122 S.Ct.
587. Even if the supervisory relationship between a
probation officer and her charge may properly be
characterized as one giving rise to needs "divorced
from the State's general interest in law enforcement,"
Fereuson, 532 US., at 79, 121 S.Ct 1281; but see
id, at 79, n. 15. 121 S.Ct. 1281, the relationship
between an ordinary law enforcemeilt officer and a
probationer unknown to him may not. "None of our
special needs precedents has sanctioned the routine
inclusion of law enforcement, both in the design of
the policy and in using arrests, either threatened or
real, to implement the system designed for the special
needs objectives."
Id.. at 88. 121 S.Ct. 1281
(KENNEDY, I., concurring in judgment).

-

Ignoring just how "closely guarded" is that "category
of constitutionally permissible suspicionless
searches," Chandler v. Miller, 520 U.S. 305. 309,
1 1 7 S.Ct, 1295, 137 L.Ed.2d 513 (19971, the Court
for the first time upholds an entirely suspicionless
search unsupported by any special need. And it goes
further: In special needs cases we have at least
insisted upon programmatic safeguards designed to
ensure evenhandedness
in
application;
if
individualized suspicion is to be jettisoned, it must be
replaced with measures to protect against the state
actor's unfettered discretion. See, e.%. D_ e l a z
Prouse, 440 U.S. 648. 654-655, 99 S.Ct. 1391. 59
L.Ed.2d 660 (1979) (where a special need "precludes
insistence upon 'some quantum of individualized
suspicion,' other safeguards are generally relied upon
to assure that the individual's reasonable expectation
of privacy is not 'subject to the discretion of the
official in the field' (quoting Cu~narav. Municipal

-

"

Fourth Amendment demands somethine more than
the broad and unlimited discretion s&ght by the
Government"). Here, by contrast, there are no
policies in place-no "standards, guidelines, or
procedures," Prouse. 440 US.. at 650.99 S.Ct. 1391to rein in officers and furnish a *861 bulwark against
the arbitrary exercise of discretion that is the height
of unreasonableness.
The Court is able to make this unprecedented move
onlv bv making another. Coupling the dubious
holhing of ~ u d i o nv. Palmer. 468 -u.s. 5 17, 1 04
S.Ct. 3194, 82 L.Ed2d 393 (19841, with the bald
statement that "~aroleeshave fewer expectations of
privacy than probationers,"ante, at 2198, the Court
two-steps its way through a faulty syllogism and,
thus, avoids the application of Fourth Amendment
principles altogether. The logic, apparently, is this:
Prisoners have no legitimate**2205 expectation of
privacy; parolees are like prisoners; therefore,
parolees have no legitimate expectation of privacy.
The conclusion is remarkable not least because we
have long embraced its opposite.m It also rests on
false premises. First, it is simply not hue that a
parolee's status, vis-a-vis either the Stale or the
Constitution, is tantamount to that of a prisoner or
even materially distinct from that of a nrobationer.
See ~ o r r i s s w ~Brewer,
v.
408 U.S. 471,482.92 S.Ct.
2593. 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (19721 ("Though the State
properly subiects ia ~aroleelto many restrictions not
ap$icabie tb othkr 'citizens, his cbndition is very
different from that of confinement in a prison"). A
parolee, like a probationer, is set free in the world
subject to restrictions intended to facilitate
supervision and guard against antisocial behavior. As
with probation, "the State is willing to extend parole
only because it is able to condition it upon
compliance with certain requirements."

m.Certainly,

parole differs from probation
insofar as parole is " 'meted out in addition *862 to,
not in lieu of, incarceration.' " Ante, at 2199
(quoting United Slntes v. Reves, 283 F.3d 446. 461
(C.A.2 20022). And, certainly, parolees typically will
have committed more serious crimes-ones warranting
a prior tern1 of imprisonment-than probationers. s he
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latter distinction, perhaps, would support the
conclusion that a State has a stronger interest in
supervising parolees than it does in supervising
probationers. But see United Stales v. Williams, 417
F.3d 373. 376, n. I (C.A.3 2005) (" '[Tlhere is no
constitutional difference between probation and
parole for purposes of the [Fjourth [Almendment' ").
But why either distinction should result in refusal to
acknowledge as legitimate, when harbored by
parolees, the same expectation of privacy that
probationers reasonably may harbor is beyond
fathom.
FN2. See Morrissev
-

v. Brewer. 408 U.S.
33 L.Ed.2d 484
(1972) ("[Tlhe liberty of a parolee, although
indeterminate. includes many of the core
of unqualified libe11~;'); Griffin v,
R'isco?zsin, 483 U.S. 868. 875. 107 S.Ct.
3 164.97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) (lhe "degree of
impingement upon [a probationer's] privacy
... is not unlimited"); see also Ferfuson. 532
US.. at 101, 121 S.Ct. 1281 (SCALIA, J.,
dissenting)
("1 doubt whether Griffin's
-,
reasonable expectation of privacy in his
home was any less than petitioners'
reasonable expectation of privacy in their
urine taken").
\

In any event, the notion that a parolee legitimately
expects only so much privacy as a prisoner is utterly
without foundation. Hudson v. Palmer does stand
for the proposition that "[a] right of privacy in
traditional Fourth Amendment terms" is denied
individuals who are incarcerated. 468 U.S.. at 527,
104 S.Ct. 3 194. But this is because it "is necessary,
as a practical maner, to accommodate a myriad of
'institutional needs and objectives' of prison facilities,
... chief amone which is internal security." L d A
524, 104 s . c t . 3 194; see
(O'Connor, J., concurring) ("I agree that the
government's compelling interest in prison safety,
together with the necessarily ad hoc judgments
required of prison ofticials, make prison cell searches
and seizures appropriate for categorical treatment"
n.n); see also **2206Treasurv Emalovees v. Von
Raab. 489 U.S. 656, 680, 109 S.Ct. 1384, 103
L.Ed.2d 685 (19891 (SCALIA, J., dissenting). These
"institutional needs"-safety of inmates and guards,
"internal order," and sanitation, Hudson. 468 U.S.. at
527-528. 104 S.Ct. 3194-manifestly*863 do not

apply to parolees. As discussed above and ill
*other
state interests may warrant certain
intrusions into a parolee's privacy, hut Hudson's
rationale cannot be mapped blindly onto the situation
with which we are presented in this case.

FN3.

Particularly in view of Justice
O'Connor's concurrence, which emphasized
the prison's programmatic interests in
conducting suspicionless searches, see
Hudson, 468 US.. at 538, 104 S.Ct.
3 194. Hudson is probably best understood as
a "special needs" case-not as standing for
the blanket proposition that prisoners have
no Fourth Amendment rights.
Nor is it enough, in deciding whether someone's
expectation of privacy is "legitimate," to rely on the
existence of the offending condition or the
individual's notice thereof. Cf. ante, at 2199.The
Court's reasoning in this respect is entirely circular.
The mere fact that a particular State refuses to
acknowledge a parolee's privacy interest cannot mean
that a parolee in that State has no expectation of
privacy that society is willing to recognize as
legitimate-especially when the measure that invades
privacy is both the subject of the Fourth Amendment
challenge and a clear outlier. With only one or two
arguable exceptions, neither the Federal Government
nor any other State subjects parolees to searches of
the kind to which petitioner was subjected. And the
fact of notice hardly cures the circularity; the loss of
a subjective expectation of privacy would play "no
meaningful role" in analyzing the legitimacy of
expectations, for example, "if the Government were
suddenly to announce on nationwide television that
all homes henceforth would be subject to warrantless
enhy." Smith v. Mawland. 442 U.S. 735, 740-741.
n. 5.99 S.Ct. 2577.61 L.Ed.2d220(19791!"

FN4.Likewise, the

State's argument that a
California parolee "consents" to the
suspicionless search condition is sophishy.
Whether or not a prisoner can choose to
remain in prison rather than be released on
parole, cf. ante, at 2199, n. 3, he has no
"choice" concerning the search condition; he
may either remain in prison, where he will
be subjected to suspicionless searches, or he
may exit prison and still be subject to
suspicionless searches. Accordingly, "to
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speak of consent in this context is to resort
to a manifest fiction, for the [parolee] who
purportedly waives his rights by accepting
such a condition has little genuine option to
refuse." 5 W. LaFave, Search and Seizure:
A Treatise on the Fourth Amendment 4
IO.lO(b), pp. 440-441 (4th ed.20041.
"864 Threaded through the Court's reasoning is the
suggestion that deprivation of Fourth Amendment
rights is part and parcel of any convict's punishment.
See ante, at 2197 2 1 9 9 . ~ If a person may be
subject to random and suspicionless searches in
prison, the Court seems to assume, then he cannot
complain when he is subject to the same invasion
outside of prison, so long as the State still can
imprison him. Punishment, though, is not the basis on
which
was decided. (Indeed, it is settled that
a prison inmate " 'retains those [constitutioi~al]rights
that are not inconsistent with his status as a prisoner
or with the legitimate penological objectives of the
corrections system.' " Turner v. Suflev. 482 U.S.
78, 95, 107 S.Ct. 2254, 96 L.Ed.2d 64 (19872.) Nor,
to my knowledge, have we ever sanctioned the use of
any search as a punitive measure. Instead, the
question in every case must be **2207 whether the
balance of legitimate expectations of privacy, on the
one hand, and the State's interests in conducting the
relevant search, on the other, justifies dispensing with
the warrant and probable-cause requirements that are
otherwise dictated by the Fourth Amendment. That
balance is not the same in prison as it is out. We held
recourse to &&&&
tha
the
in &&&-without
balance favored allowing the State to conduct
searches based on reasonable suspicion. Never before
have we plunged below that floor absent a
demonstration of "special needs."

-

FNS. This
-

is a vestige of the longdiscredited "act of grace" theory of parole.
Compare Escoe v. Zerhst, 295 U.S. 490,
492-493.55 S.Ct. 81 8.79 L.Ed. 1566 (1935)
f"Probation or suspension of sentence comes
as an act of grace to one convicted of a
crime, and may be coupled with such
conditions in resoect of its duration as
Congress may impose"), with Gaanon v.
Scnruelli. 411 U.S. 778, 782, n. 4. 93 S.Ct.
1756.36 L.Ed.2d 656 (1973) ("a probationer
can no longer be denied due process, in
reliance on the dictum in Escoe v. Zerbst.

that rob at ion is an 'act of trrace' " (citation
omiied)). See also ~ o r r i s ~ r e408
x u.s.. at
482.92 S.Ct. 2593.
Had the State imposed as a condition of parole a
requirement that petitioner submit to random
searches by his parole officer, who is "supposed to
have in mind the welfare of the *865 [parolee]" and
guide the parolee's transition back into society,
Griffilz. 483 US., at 876-877. 107 S.Ct. 3164, the
condition might have been justified either under the
special needs doctrine or because at least part of the
requisite "reasonable suspicion" is supplied in this
context by the individual-specific knowledge gained
through the supervisory relationship. See id., at 879,
107 S.Ct. 3164 (emphasizing probation office's
ability to "assess probabilities in the light of its
knowledge of [the probationer's] life, character, and
circumstances"). Likewise, this might have been a
different case had a court or parole board imposed the
condition at issue based on specific knowledge of the
individual's criminal history and projected likelihood
of reoffending, or if the State had had in place
programmatic safeguards to ensure evenhandedness.
See s u p , at 2 197. Under either of those scenarios,
the State would at least have gone some way toward
averting the greatest mischief wrought by officials'
unfettered discretion. But the search condition here is
imposed on all parolees-whatever the nature of their
crimes, whatever their likelihood of recidivism, and
whatever their supervisory needs-without any
programmatic procedural protections.-FN6
FN6. The Court devotes a good portion of
-

its analysis to the recidivism rates among
parolees in California. See ante, at 2200.
One might question whether those statistics,
which postdate the Califomia Supreme
Court's decision to allow the purportedly
recidivism-reducing suspicionless searches
at issue here, actually demonstrate that the
State's interest is being served by the
searches. Cf. Reply Brief for Petitioner 10,
and n. 10. Of course, one cannot deny that
the interest itself is valid. That said, though,
it has never been held sufficient to justify
suspicionless searches. If high crime rates
were grounds enough for disposing of
Fourth Amendment protections, the
Amendment long ago would have become a
dead letter.
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The Court seems to acknowledge that unreasonable
searches "inflic[t] dignitary harms that arouse snong
resentment in parolees and undermine their ability to
reintegrate into productive society." Ante, at 2201;
see Teriv v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1. 19, 29. 88 S.Ct. 1868,
20 L.Ed.2d 889 (1968). It is satisfied, however, that
the *866 California courts' prohibition against "
'arbitrary, capricious or harassing' " searches suffices
to avert those harms-which are of course
counterproduc!ive to the State's purported aim of
rehabilitating Former prisoners and reintegrating them
into societv. See ante, at 2201 (citing Peoale v.
Reves. 19 Cal.4th 743. 80 Cal.Rptr.2d 734,968 P.2d
445 (1998)). 1 am unpersuaded. The requirement of
individualized suspicion, in all its iterations, is the
shield the Framer~selectedto guard against the evils
of arbitrary action, caprice, and harassment. To say
that those evils may be averted without that shield is,
I fear, to pay lipservice to the end while withdrawing
the means.m
FN7. As the
-

Court observes, see ante, at
2202, n. 5, under California law "an officer
is entitled to conduct suspicionless searches
only of persons known by him to be
parolees." Brief for United States as Amicus
Curiae 20 (citing Peoale v. Sanders. 3 1
Cal.4th 318. 331-332. 2 CaI.R~tr.3d630. 73
P.3d 496, 505 (20032. It would necessarily
be arbitrary, capricious, and harassing to
conduct a suspicionless search of someone
without knowledge of the status that renders
that person, in the State's judgment,
susceptible to such an invasion.
Respectfully, I dissent.
U.S.Ca1.,2006.
Samson v. California
547 U.S. 843, 126 S.Ct. 2193, 165 L.Ed2d 250, 74
USLW 4349, 06 Cal. Daily Op. Sew. 5257, 2006
Daily Journal D.A.R. 7626, 2006 Daily Journal
D.A.R. 7627, 2006 Daily Journal D.A.R. 7630, 19
Fla. L. Weekly Fed. S 306
END OF DOCUMENT
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Arrest 35 @63.4(6)

35 Arrest
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-

Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without

Warrant

Argued Nov. 3,2003.
Decided Dec. 15,2003
Following a jury trial, defendant was convicted in the
Circuit Court, Baltimore County, Christian M. Kahl,
J., of possession with intent to distribute cocaine and
possession of cocaine. Defendant appealed. The
Court of Special Appeals, 141 Md.Auu. 292. 785
A.2d 790, affinned. Defendant filed petition for writ
of certiorari. The Court of Appeals of Maryland, 3.22
Md. 525. 805 A.2d 1016,Cathell, J., reversed.
Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, Chief
Justice Rehnauist, held that police officer had
probable cause to believe that defendant, who was the
front-seat passenger in vehicle, committed the crime
of possession of cocaine.

35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable Cause

35k63.4(6) k. Nature and Source of
Information in General. Most Cited Cases
Maryland law authorizes police officers to execute
warrantless arrests, inter alia, for felonies committed
in an officer's presence or where an officer has
probable cause to believe that a felony has been
committed or is being committed in the officer's
presence.
Art. 27. 6 594B
{ReueaIed).
Arrest 35 -63.4(5)
35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges
-

Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without

Reversed and remanded.

Wanant
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J Searches and Seizures 349 -23
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349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
-

k. Fourth Amendment
Reasonableness in General. Most Cited Cases

aProbable or Reasonable Cause

35k63.4(3 k. Nature of Offense;
Felony or Misdemeanor. Most Cited Cases

West Headnotes

and

35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
Warrant

Searches and Seizures 349 -113.1
349 Searches and Seizures
34911 Warrants
Probable or Reasonable Cause
349k113.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Under the Fourth Amendment, made applicable to
the States by the Fourteenth Amendment, the people
are to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searchcs and seizures,
and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause.

35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable Cause

35k63.4(6) k. Nature and Source of
Information in General. Most Cited Cases
A warrantless arrest of an individual in a public place
for a felony, or a misdemeanor committed in the
officer's presence, is consistent with the Fourth
Amendment if the arrest is supported by probable
cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4.
Arrest 35 -63.4(17)
35 Arrest
-
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On Criminal Charges
Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
Warrant

aProbable or Reasonable Cause

3Sk63.4(171 k. Arrested Person's
Presence or Association. Most Cited Cases
Police officer had probable cause to believe that
defendant, who was the front-seat passenger in
vehicle, committed the crime of possession of
cocaine, either solely or jointly with other occupants
of vehicle, and therefore defendant's arrest did not
contravene the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments,
where defendant was one of three men riding in the
vehicle at 3:16 a.m., $763 of rolled-up cash was
found in the glove compartment directly in front of
defendant, five plastic glassine baggies of cocaine
were behind the back-seat armrest and accessible to
all three vehicle occupants, and, upon questioning,
the three men failed to offer any information with
respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money.
U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4 , B .

U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4 , U .
J
6
J Arrest 35 -63.4(2)

35 Arrest
-

On Criminal Charges

35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
Warrant

w Probable or Reasonable Cause

35k63.4(2) k. What Constitutes Such
Cause in General. Most Cited Cases
Searches and Seizures 349 -40.1
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
-

Probable Cause
349k40.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Searches and Seizures 349 -113.1

349 Searches and Seizures

Arrest 35 -63.4(2)

34911 Warrants
-

35 Arrest
3511 On Criminal Charges
Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
Warrant
35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable Cause
35k63.4[2) k. What Constitutes Such
Cause in General. Most Cited Cases
Searches and Seizures 349 -40.1
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
-

349Probable Cause
349k40.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Searches and Seizures 349 -113.1
349 Searches and Seizures
-

34911 Warrants

Probable or Reasonable Cause
349k113.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The long-prevailing standard of probable cause
protects citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and f ~ o m unfounded
cl~arges of crime, while giving fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection.

Probable or Reasonable Cause
349k113.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The probable-cause standard is a practical,
nontechnical conception that deals with the factual
and practical considerations of everyday life on
which reasonable and prudent men, not legal
technicians, act. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4 , U .
Arrest 35 -63.4(2)

S Arrest

35U On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
-

Warrant

Probable or Reasonable Cause
35k63,4(2) k. What Constitutes Such
Cause in General. Most Cited Cases
Searches and Seizures 349 -40.1
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 in General
-

Probable Cause
349k40.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Searches and Seizures 349 -113.1
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349 Searches and Seizures
34911 Warrants

34Probable or Reasonable Cause
349kl 13.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Probable cause is a fluid concept, turning on the
assessment of probabilities in particular factual
contexts, not readily, or even usefully, reduced to a
neat set of legal rules. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4 , s .

the person to be searched or seized. USGlL
Const.Amends. 4 , s .
Arrest 35 @;563.4(2)
35 Arrest
-

3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
-

Warrant
.... .

35k63.4 Probable or Reasonable Cause
pJ Arrest 35 -63.4(2)
35 Arrest

3511 On Criminal Charges
35k63 Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without
-

Warrant

Probable or Reasonable Cause
35k63.4(2) k. What Constitutes Such
Cause in General. Most Cited Cases
Searches and Seizures 349 -40.1
349 Searches and Seizures
3491 In General
-

Probable Cause
349k40.1 k. In General. Most Cited Cases

Searches and Seizures 349 -113.1
34_9 Searches and
-.

Seizures
34911 Warrants
Probable or Reasonable Cause
349k113. I k. In General. Most Cited Cases
The probable-cause standard is incapable of precise
definitioil or quantification into percentages because
it deals with probabilities and depends on the totality
of the circumstances. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends. 4,14.

-

Arrest 35 -63.4(2)
35 Arrest
-

3511 On Criminal Charges
-

Officers and Assistants, Arrest Without

Warrant
Probable or Reasonable Cause
35k63.412) k. What Constitutes Such
Cause in General. Most Cited Cases
The substance of all the definitions of probable cause
is a reasonable ground for belief of guilt, and the
belief of guilt must be particularized with respect to

35k63.4(2) k. What Constitutes Such
Cause in General. Most Cited Cases
To dete~minewhether an officer had probable cause
to arrest an individual, a court will examine the
events leading up to the arrest, and then decide
whether these historical Facts, viewed from the
standpoint of an objectively reasonable police officer,
amount to probable cause. U.S.C.A. Const.Amends.

4,14.
**797 *366Syllabus

FN* The syllabus constitutes no part of the
opinion of the Court but has been prepared
by the Reporter of Decisions for the
convenience of the reader. See Unifed Slates
v. Detroit Timber dl. Lumber Co., 200 U.S.
321.337,26 S.Ct. 282.50 L.Ed. 499.
A police officer stopped a car for speeding at 3:16
a.m.; searched the car, seizing $763 from the glove
compartment and cocaine from behind the back-seat
armrest; and arrested the car's three occupants after
they denied ownership of the drugs and money.
Respondent Pringle, the front-seat passenger, was
convicted of possession with intent to dishibute
cocaine and possession of cocaine, and was
sentenced to 10 years' incarceration without the
possibility of parole. The Maryland Court of Special
Appeals affirmed, but the State Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to
show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control
over the drugs, the mere finding of cocaine in the
back armrest when Pringle was a front-seat passenger
in a car being driven by its owner was insufficient to
establish probable cause for an arrest for possession.
Held: Because the officer had probable cause to
arrest Pringle, the arrest did not contravene the
Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments. Maryland law
authorizes police officers to execute warrantless
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arrests, inter alia, where the officer has probable
cause to believe that a felony has been committed or
is being committed in the officer's presence. Were, it
is uncontested that the officer, upon recovering the
suspected cocaine, had probable cause to believe a
felony had been committed; the question is whether
he had probable cause to believe Pringle committed
that crime. The "substance of all the definitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt,"
175.
69 S.Ct. 1302, 93 L.Ed. 1879, and that belief must be
particularized with respect to the person to be
searched or seized, f'harm v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85,
91. 100 S.Ct. 338. 62 L.Ed.2d 238. To determine
whether an officer had probable cause to make an
arrest, a court must examine the events leading up to
the arrest, and then decide "whether these historical
facts, viewed from the standpoint of an objectively
reasonable police officer, amount to" probable cause.
Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690. 696. 116
S.Ct. 1657. 134 L.Ed.2d 91 1. As it is an entirely
reasonable inference from the facts here that any or
all of the car's occupants had knowledge of, and
exercised dominion and control over, the cocaine, a
reasonable officer could conclude that there was
probable cause to believe Pringle committed the
crime of possession of cocaine, either solely or
jointly. Pringle's attempt to characterize this as a
guilt-by-association case is *367 unavailing. &EG
v. Illinois. supra& and Unifed States v. Di Re. 332
U
.
S
.
distinguished.
Pp. 799-802.
370 Md. 525, 805 A.2d 1016, reversed and
remanded.
REHNOUIST, C.J., delivered the opinion for a
unanimous Court.
**798 G a y E. Bair, Baltimore, MD, for petitioner.
Sri Srinivasan, for United States as amicus curiae, by
special leave of the Court, supporting the petitioner.
Nancv S. Forster, Baltimore, MD, for respondent.
J . Joseph Cunan, Jr., Attorney General of Maryland,
Gary E. Bair, Solicitor General, K a t h n Grill Graeff,
Shannon E. Avery, Assistant Attorneys General,
Baltimore, Maryland, for petitioner.
Stevhen E. Harris, Nancv S. Forster, Deputy Public
Defender, Sherrie Glasser, Assistant Public Defender,
Baltimore, Maryland, for respondent.For U.S.
Supreme Court Briefs, see:2003 WL 21999023

Chief Justice REIINQUIST delivered the opinion of
the Court.
In the early morning hours a passenger car occupied
by three men was stopped for speeding by a police
officer. The *368 officer, upon searching the car,
seized $763 of rolled-up cash from the glove
con~partmentand five glassine baggies of cocaine
from between the back-seat armrest and the back
seat. After all three men denied ownership of the
cocaine and money, the officer arrested each of them.
We hold that the officer had probable cause to arrest
Pringle-one of the three men.
At 3:16 a.m. on August 7, 1999, a Baltimore County
Police officer stopped a Nissan Maxima for speeding.
There were three occupants in the car: Donte Partlow,
the driver and owner, respondent Pringle, the frontseat passenger, and Otis Smith, the back-seat
passenger. The officer asked Partlow for his license
and registration. When Partlow opened the glove
compartment to retrieve the vehicle registration, the
officer observed a large amount of rolled-up money
in the glove compartment. The officer returned to his
patrol car with Partlow's license and registration to
check the computer system for outstanding
violations. The computer check did not reveal any
violations. The officer returned to the stopped car,
had Partlow get out, and issued him an oral warning.
After a second patrol car arrived, the officer asked
Partlow if he had any weapons or narcotics in the
vehicle. Partlow indicated that he did not. Partlow
then consented to a search of the vehicle. The search
yielded $763 from the glove compartment and five
plastic glassine baggies containing cocaine from
behind the back-seat armrest. When the officer began
the search the armrest was in the upright position flat
against the rear seat. The officer pulled down the
armrest and found the drugs, which had been placed
between the armrest and the back seat of the car.
The officer questioned all three men about the
ownership of the drugs and money, and told then1
that if no one admitted to ownership of the drugs he
was going to arrest them all. The men offered no
information regarding the ownership*369 of the
drugs or money. All three were placed under arrest
and transported to the police station.
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Later that morning, Pringle waived his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S.Ct. 1602, 16
L.Ed.2d 694 (19662, and gave an oral and written
confession in which he acknowledged that the
cocaine belonged to him, that be and his friends were
going to a party, and that he intended to sell the
cocaine or "[ulse it for sex." App. 26. Pringle
maintained that the other occupants of the car did not
know about the drugs, and they were released.

**799 The trial court denied Pringle's motion to
suppress his confession as the h i t of an illegal
arrest, holding that the officer had probable cause to
arrest Pringle. A jury convicted Pringle of possession
with intent to distribute cocaine and possession of
cocaine. He was sentenced to 10 years' incarceration
without the possibility of parole. The Court of
Special Appeals of Maryland affirmed.
141
Md.App. 292,785 A.2d 790 (200lb
The Court of Appeals of Maryland, by divided vote,
reversed, holding that, absent specific facts tending to
show Pringle's knowledge and dominion or control
over the drugs, "the mere fmding of cocaine in the
back armrest when [Priiigle] was a front seat
passenger in a car being driven by its owner is
insufficient to establish probable cause for an arrest
for possession!'
370 Md. 525, 545, 805 A.2d 1016,
1027 (2002). We granted certiorari, 538 U.S. 92 1,
123 S.Ct. 1571. 155 L.Ed.2d 31 l(20031, and now
reverse.
Under the Fourtb Amendment, made
applicable to the States bv the Fourteenth
Amendment, Maup v. Ohio. 36f U.S. 643. 81 S.Ct.
1684. 6 L.Ed2d 1081 (19611, the people are "to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers,
. . . and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, ... and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause ...."
U.S. Const., Amdt. 4. Maryland law authorizes police
officers to execute warrantless arrests, infer alia, for
felonies committed in an officer's presence or where
an officer has probable cause to believe that a felony
"370 has been committed or is being committed in
the officer's presence. Md. Ann.Code. Art. 27. 4
5948 (19961 (repealed 2001). A warrantless awest of
an individual in a public place for a felony, or a
misdemeanor committed in the officer's presence, is
consistent with the Fourth Amendment if the arrest is
supported by probable cause.
Uizized States v.

Watson. 423 U.S. 41 1, 424. 96 S.Ct. 820, 46 L.Ed.2d
598 (1976); see Atwater v Laao Yista, 532 U.S. 318,
354. 121 S.Ct. 1536. 149 L.Ed.2d 549 (2001) (stating
that "[i]f an officer has probable cause to believe that
an individual has committed even a very minor
criminal offense in his presence, be may, without
violating the Fourth Amendment, arrest the
offender").

J$p

It is uncontested in the present case that the
officer, upon recovering the five plastic glassine
haggies containing suspected cocaine, had probable
cause to believe a felony had been committed. &l&
Ann.Code. Art. 27. 6 287 (1996) (repealed 2002)
(prohibiting possession of controlled dangerous
substances). The sole question is whether the officer
had probable cause to believe that Pringle committed
that crime,m

FNI.Maryland law defines "possession" as
"the exercise of actual or constructive
dominion or control over a thine bv one ed l 27. 4
more persons." Md. ~ n n . ~ o Art.
277(s) (19961 (repealed 2002).
The long-prevailing standard of probable
cause protects "citizens from rash and unreasonable
interferences with privacy and from unfounded
charges of crime," while giving "fair leeway for
enforcing the law in the community's protection."
~ r i n e ~ v.
a r United Slates. 338 U:S. '160. 176, 69
S.Ct. 1302. 93 L.Ed. 1879 (19491. On many
occasions. we have reiterated that the prohable-cause"
standard is a " 'practical, nontechnicai conception' "
that deals with " 'the factual and practical
considerations of everyday life on which reasonable
and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.' "
111indis v. Gates. 462 U.~.-213, 231. 103 S.Ct. 2317,
76 L.Ed.2d 527 (1983) (quoting Brineear, suora. at
175-176. 69 S.Ct. 13021; see, e.g., **8000rnelas v.
United States. 517 U.S. 690. 695, 116 S.Ct. 1657,
134 L.Ed.2d 91 1 (1996); United Slates v. Sokolow,
490 U.S. 1, 7-8. 109 S.Ct. 1581, 104 L.Ed.2d I
"[PJrohable cause is a fluid *371 conceptturning on the assessment of probabilities in
particular factual contexts-not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules."
Gares, 462 U.S.. at 232, 103 S.Ct. 2317.

m.
-

@lJ9JThe probable-cause standard is incapable of

precise definition or quantification into percentages
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because it deals with probabilities and depends on the
totality of the circumstances. See & Brinepar.
338 U.S., at 175. 69 S.Ct. 1302. We have stated,
however, that "[tlhe substance of all the defmitions of
probable cause is a reasonable ground for belief of
guilt," &&(internal quotation marks and citations
omitted), and that the belief of guilt must be
particul~ized with respect to the person to be
searched or seized, Ybarra v. Illinois. 444 U.S. 85,
91, 100 S.Ct. 338, 62 L.Ed2d 238 (19791. In
we noted:
"As early as Locke v. Uniled StalesS7 Cranch 339,
348. 3 L.Ed. 364 (18131, Chief Justice Marshall
observed, in a closely related context: '[Tlhe term
"probable cause," according to its usual
acceotation. means less than evidence which wn~lld
tustifv,condemnation .... It iinports a seizure mnde
"
under circu~nstances which warrant suspicion '
More recently, we said that 'the quanta ... of proof
appropriate in ordiniuy judicial proceedings are
inapplicable to the decision to issue a warrant.
Brinepar, 338 U.S.. at 173. 69 S.Ct. 1302. Finely
tuned standards such as proof beyond a reasonable
doubt or by a preponderance of the evidence,
useful in formal trials, have no place in the
[probable-cause] decision." 462 US.. at 235, 103
S.Ct. 23 17.
~~

~

To determine whether an officer had probable
cause to arrest an individual, we examine the events
leading up to the arrest, and then decide "whether
these historical facts, viewed from the standpoint of
an objectively reasonable police officer, amount to"
probable cause, Omelas. supra, at 696. 116 S.Ct.

1657.
In this case, Pringle was one of three men riding in a
Nissan Maxima at 3:16 a.m. There was $763 of
rolled-up cash "372 in the glove compartment
directly in front of ~ r i n g l e . Five
~ plastic glassine
baggies of cocaine were behind the back-seat amrest
and accessible to all three men. Upon questioning,
the three men failed to offer any information with
respect to the ownership of the cocaine or the money.

FN2. The

Court of Appeals of Maryland
dismissed the $763 seized from the glove
comparhnent as a factor in the probablecause determination, stating that "[mloney,
without more, is innocuous." 370 Md. 525,

546, 805 A.2d 1016, 1028 (20021. The
court's consideration of The money in
isolation, rather than as a factor in the
totalitv of the circumstances. is mistaken in..
light of our precedents. See, e.g., Illinois v.
Gates. 462 U.S. 213, 230-231, 103 S.Ct.
2317, 76 L.Ed.2d 527 (19831 (opining that
the totality of the circumstances approach is
consistent with our prior treatment of
probable cause); Brinepar v. United Slates,
338 U.S. 160. 175-176. 69 S.Ct. 1302, 93
L.Ed. 1879 (1949) YProbable cause exists
where 'the facts and circumstances within
their [the officers'] knowledge and of which
they had reasonably trustworthy information
[are] sufficient in themselves to warrant a
man of reasonable caution in the belief that'
an offense has been or is being committed").
We think it is abundantly clear from the
facts that this case involves more than
money alone.
We thimk it an entirely reasonable inference from
these facts that any or all three of the occupants had
knowledge of, and exercised dominion and control
over, the cocaine. Thus, a reasonable officer could
**SO1 conclude that there was probable cause to
believe Pringle committed the crime of possession of
cocaine, either solely or jointly.
Pringle's attempt to characterize this case as a guilt..
bv-association case is unavailing. His reliance on
Ybarra v. Illinois, suura, and United Sdafes v. Di Re,
332 U.S. 581, 68 S.Q. 222, 92 L.Ed. 210 (19481, is
misplaced. In Ybarra, police officers obtained a
warrant to search a tavern and its bartender for
evidence of possession of a controlled substance.
Upon entering the tavern, the officers conducted
patdown searches of the customers present in the
tavern, including Ybama. Inside a cigarette pack
retrieved from Ybarra's pocket, an officer found six
tinfoil packets containing heroin. We stated:
"[A] person's mere propinquity to others
independently suspected of criminal activity does
not, without more, *373 give rise to probable cause
to search that person. Sibron v. New I'ork. 392
U.S. 40. 62-631. 88 S.Ct. 1889, 20 L.Ed.2d 9171
(1968'). Where the standard is probable cause, a
search or seizure of a person must be supported by
probable cause particularized with respect to that
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peison. This requirement cannot be undercut or
avoided by simply pointing to the fact that
coincidentally there exists probable cause to search
or seize another or to search the premises where the
person nlay happen to be." 444 U.S.. at 91. 100
S.Q. 338.
We held that the search warrant did not permit body
searches of all of the tavern's patrons and that the
police could not pat down the patrons for weapons,
absent individualized suspicion. Id. at 92, 100 S.Ct.
338.
This case is quite different from @gng Pringle and
his two companions were in a relatively small
automobile, not a public tavern. In Wvomin~v.
Houglzton, 526 U.S. 295. 119 S.Ct. 1297. 143
L.Ed.2d 408 (19992 we noted that "a car passengerunlike the unwitting tavern patron in --will
often be engaged in a common enterprise with the
driver, and have the same interest in concealing the
fruits or the evidence of their wrongdoing."
304-305, 119 S.Ct. 1297. Here we think it was
reasonable for the officer to infer a common
enterprise among the three men. The quantity of
drugs and cash in the car indicated the likelihood of
drug dealing, an enterprise to which a dealer would
be unlikely to admit an innocent person with the
potential to furnish evidence against him.

singling out occurred in this case; none of the three
men provided information with respect to the
ownership of the cocaine or money.
**802 We hold that the officer had probable cause to
believe that Pringle had committed the crime of
possession of a controlled substance. Pringle's arrest
therefore did not contravene the Fourth and
Fourteenth Amendments. Accordingly, the judgment
of the Court of Appeals of Maryland is reversed, and
the case is remanded for furfher proceedings not
inconsistent with this opinion.

It is so ordered,
U.S.Md.,2003.
Maryland v. Pringle
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In
a federal investigator had been told by an
informant, Reed, that he was to receive counterfeit
gasoline ration coupons from a certain Buttitta at a
particular place. The investigator went to the
appointed place and saw Reed, the sole occupant of
the rear seat of the car, holding gasoline ration
coupons. There were two other occupants in the car:
Buttitta in tlie driver's seat and Di Re in the front
passenger's seat. Reed informed the investigator that
Buttitta had given him counterfeit coupons.
Thereupon, all three men were arrested and searched.
After noting that the officers had no information
implicating *374 Di Re and no information pointing
to Di Re's possession of coupons, unless presence in
the car warranted that inference, we concluded that
the officer lacked probable cause to believe that Di
Re was involved in the crime. 332 U.S.. at 592-594.
68 S.Ct. 222.
We said "[alny inference that
everyone on the scene of a crime is a party to it must
disappear if the Government informer singles out the
guilty person." Id.. at 594. 68 S.Ct. 222. No such
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